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Existing theories of empathic response to visual art works postulate the primacy of
automatic embodied reaction to images based on mirror neuron mechanisms. Arguing
for a more inclusive concept of empathy-related response and integrating four distinct
bodies of literature, we discuss contextual, and personal factors which modulate
empathic response to depicted people. We then present an integrative model of
empathy-related responses to depicted people in art works. The model assumes that
a response to empathy-eliciting figural artworks engages the dynamic interaction of
two mutually interlinked sets of processes: socio-affective/cognitive processing, related
to the person perception, and esthetic processing, primarily concerned with esthetic
appreciation and judgment and attention to non-social aspects of the image. The
model predicts that the specific pattern of interaction between empathy-related and
esthetic processing is co-determined by several sets of factors: (i) the viewer’s individual
characteristics, (ii) the context variables (which include various modes of priming by
narratives and other images), (iii) multidimensional features of the image, and (iv) aspects
of a viewer’s response. Finally we propose that the model is implemented by the
interaction of functionally connected brain networks involved in socio-cognitive and
esthetic processing.
Keywords: empathy, art experience, socio-affective processing, affective affordance, esthetic processing, art
work
INTRODUCTION
Empathy-related phenomena occupy a central place in contemporary neuropsychology and
social and affective neuroscience. This research agenda, spurred both by the rapid spread of
neuroimaging, and new conceptual models, has been accompanied in the past two decades by the
rediscovery of empathy in the humanities, particularly in art history and theory and in film studies.
In itself, this rediscovery can be set within the larger context of what might loosely be termed the
“bodily” and the “emotional” turn in the humanities and social sciences (Papoulias and Callard,
2010; Lanzoni, 2012). It is increasingly evident that empathy-related issues offer the possibility for
productive interfacing between the sciences of the mind and brain and the humanities. Within the
humanities, the role of embodied meaning-making in pictorial and esthetic experience has been
examined not only in more philosophical and theoretical writings (e.g., Curtis and Koch, 2009;
Coplan and Goldie, 2011) but also in art-historical and critical texts devoted to specific works
of art written by some of the leading art historians of our times. Scholars such as Leo Steinberg
and Michael Fried have written rich and nuanced accounts of bodily projection and empathic
engagements with works of art (Steinberg, 1988, 2001; Fried, 2002). Many works of visual art engage
and facilitate complex emotional and empathic reactions, thereby potentially serving as a testing
ground for such complex reactions in real-life situations.
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The best art-historical accounts of embodiment and emotional
engagement with works of art, such as Steinberg’s and
Fried’s, operate on the level of behavioral explanation and
are firmly rooted in the phenomenology of their authors’
viewing experience, without taking into consideration the current
conceptualizations of emotional and empathic reactions. On
the other hand, cognitive-psychological and neuroscientific
accounts of empathic response to works of art do not, as
a rule, incorporate the subjective accounts of actual viewing
experiences and/or relevant art-historical facts (Kandel, 2012).
However, it is increasingly recognized (see e.g., Bullot and Reber,
2013; psycho-historical framework for empirical esthetics; also
Bergeron and Lopes, 2014; Gopnik, 2014) that disregarding
the historical and subjective dimensions of artworks, which is
typical in the neuroscience of art, actually hinders progress
in the field. The specific problem of empathic response to
visual artworks spans multiple research fields and requires
cross-fertilization among at least four distinct and extensive
literatures: (i) the psychology and neuroscience of empathy-
related phenomena and the affective processing of visual
stimuli; (ii) empirical esthetics/neuroesthetics; (iii) problems of
immersion and simulation in fictive worlds; and (iv) relevant
art-historical and critical scholarship. In this paper we integrate
these literatures in an effort to demonstrate that theoretical
models of emotional and empathic response to works of art
(which could be used to formulate hypotheses and guide future
empirical research) must not be insulated from at least some
account of actual experiential engagement with works of art and
from art-historical facts. Consequently, after briefly discussing
the limits of current models of empathic response to visual
art works, we discuss several key modulating factors, focusing
primarily on interlinked contextual frames (Section Contextual
Framing: Pictorial, Spatial-Experiential, and Cultural Contexts)
and the role of the representational medium in staging a “reality
effect” (or witness perspective) in empathic response (Section
The Role of the Representational Medium and the Reality-Effect
in Empathic Response). With this background, we then proceed
to outline an integrative model of empathy-related response to
figural art works (Section An Integrated Model of Empathy-
Related Responses to Figural Artworks).
THE LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT MODELS
OF EMPATHIC RESPONSE TO VISUAL ART
WORKS
Arguably the best-known attempt to link current neuroscientific
research on empathy to visual art is that of Freedberg and Gallese
(2007). Their theory stems from Gallese’s embodied simulation
hypothesis, which posits that the mirror-neuron system allows
human subjects to directly understand the meaning not only of
others’ actions but also of their emotions by internally replicating
them without any explicit reflective cognition (Gallese, 2003;
Gallese et al., 2004). Consequently, Freedberg and Gallese argue
against the primacy of cognition in our responses to art. They
claim that the “crucial element of esthetic response” involves
the activation of universal embodied mechanisms encompassing
the simulation of actions, emotions and corporeal sensation, and
they conclude: “Automatic empathetic responses constitute a basic
level of response to images and to works of art. Underlying such
responses is the process of embodied simulation that enables the
direct experiential understanding of the intentional and emotional
contents of images. The basic level of reaction to images becomes
essential to any understanding of their effectiveness as art”
(Freedberg and Gallese, 2007, p. 202).
Briefly admitting the importance of historical and contextual
factors, they insist that they “do not contradict the importance of
“basic mechanisms” of response” (ibid; see also Freedberg, 2007;
Gallese, 2010). Elsewhere Freedberg claims that the impact of an
image such as Rogier van der Weyden’s Descent from the Cross
on both the fifteenth-century and the modern-day viewer would
depend on “... a set of cortical responses that have little to do
with context...but everything to do with the connection between
sight of the bodies and movements of others and the viewers’
sense of their own bodies and movements” (Freedberg, 2011,
p. 345–346, emphasis added). Freedberg and Gallese’s account
apparently simplifies what is a much more complicated process.
It has already been criticized on several grounds (Casati and
Pignocchi, 2007; Kesner, 2010; Gallagher, 2011; Krois, 2011;
Davies, 2014; Schott, 2015; for the most detailed criticism, see
Minissale, 2013, p. 84–108), so we shall reiterate only the main
point here, which is that the role of embodied simulation (and
the mirror-neuron system—hereafter MNS) as the underlying
neural mechanism in a viewer’s complex understanding of
works of art or indeed images is questionable. The authors
write: “viewers report bodily empathy,” “viewers often experience,”
“most spectators of works of art are familiar with feelings of
empathetic engagements with what they see in the work itself ”
(our emphasis). They argue that embodied simulation is crucial
for a direct experiential understanding of images, which is
essential to their effectiveness as art. But while we take the
first-person accounts of art experience as indispensable source
of information, there is little empirical evidence to support
such generalizations about viewers’ experiences. Moreover, there
is scant evidence for the role of MNS in empathic response
to art, and most importantly, the empathic response, on our
account, cannot be limited to motor resonance with depicted
bodies. This is aptly summarized by Minissale: “It could be said
that not only does Freedberg overemphasize the importance of
empathy in art, but that he also promotes a particularly simplistic
form of empathy” (Minissale, 2013, p. 104). While the merits
of the simulation theory of empathy and the role of MNS in
empathy-related responses to socially salient signals continue to
be subjects of intense debate (e.g., Decety, 2010b; Baird et al.,
2011; Fan et al., 2011; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011; Hickok,
2013; Spaulding, 2013; Caramazza et al., 2014; Mikulan et al.,
2014; Ando et al., 2015; Gallese and Caruana, 2016), many
authors agree that the MNS does not play a substantive role
in understanding emotions and empathic response. As Lamm
and Majdandžic (2015, p. 20) recently summarized, “...empathy
neither requires, nor can be exhaustively explained by “mirror
neurons”. However, it is not our intention here either to dismiss
the simulation model of empathy or to deny any role for MNS
in the empathic and possibly esthetic experience of art works.
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Rather, we emphasize that affective resonance heavily depends on
a viewer’s cognitively elaborated understanding of the depicted
person’s (and/or the artist’s) state of mind, as well as their
circumstances, that is, on an extensive imaginative projection,
and thus the role of embodied simulation (and MNS as its
neural substrate) in reflective empathic experience appears to
be rather limited. Consequently, we aim to replace current
accounts of (narrowly defined) empathic response to visual arts,
which exclusively focus on automatic embodied simulation and
MNS activation (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007; Kandel, 2012),
with a more inclusive model capable of incorporating empathy-
related responses to depicted people within the broader pictorial
experience. After all, understanding the power of images to elicit
affective and empathic responses in their viewers—a subject of
long-standing interest—continues to pose a research challenge
with profound social implications.
VARIETIES OF EMPATHY AND THE
MODULATORY FACTORS OF EMPATHY—A
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Given the semantic density of the term “empathy” and the
terminological inconsistencies surrounding its usage (among
recent reviews, see, e.g., Batson, 2009; Cuff et al., 2014), it is
not surprising that in discussions of empathy in art, the concept
is used to refer to different things—from embodied projection
into depicted bodies to feelings of compassion elicited by images.
While there is no agreed upon definition of empathy, there is a
broad consensus that an evolutionary younger cognitive system
is layered on top of affective processes, with the more ancient
andmore direct visceral-motor mechanism providing scaffolding
for more advanced cognitive elaboration and description (Gallese
et al., 2004; Keysers and Gazzola, 2009; Shamay-Tsoory et al.,
2009; Decety, 2010a, 2011; Fan et al., 2011; Bernhardt and
Singer, 2012). Alternatively, empathy-related responses can be
conceptualized as involving three domains: motor, affective, and
cognitive empathy (Decety andMeyer, 2008).Much attention has
been focused lately on the mutual integration and cooperation of
the neural structures subserving these domains (Shamay-Tsoory
et al., 2009; Cox et al., 2012; Sebastian et al., 2012; Spunt and
Lieberman, 2012; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012; Gonzalez-Liencres
et al., 2013; Kanske et al., 2015; Mitchell and Phillips, 2015;
Schlaffke et al., 2015).
We acknowledge that the response to a work of figural art
can in some instances take the form of (largely reflexive) motor
resonance with the depicted body or with pictorial elements
of the painting (along the lines envisaged in the notion of
Einfühlung, as originally formulated by Vischer (1873) and Lipps
(1903) and as discussed by Freedberg and Gallese (2007), without
any further cognitive elaboration. However, here we use the term
empathy in a more inclusive sense, as referring to the ability
to feel and understand what the depicted subject is seen as
experiencing. Following a number of influential accounts (e.g.,
Batson, 1991; Davis, 1996; Decety and Jackson, 2004; Keen,
2006; De Vignemont and Jacob, 2012; Gallagher, 2012; Walter,
2012; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012; Clarke et al., 2015), we take
empathy to be more than automatic mirroring and contagion.
Instead, it incorporates (i) affective response to a depicted
person (sometimes labeled affective empathy), (ii) cognitive
understanding, which provides some insight into that person’s
mental state and situation (sometimes labeled cognitive empathy
or affective mentalizing), and (iii) a clear sense of self–other
distinction, which precludes the confusing the self with the target.
On such an account, empathy involves experiencing in some
measure the depicted person’s emotional state, that is, it involves:
recognition, some degree of understanding and, in most cases, at
least some affective resonance or sharing of the inferred mental
state. Given the fact that emotional expressions in art works are
often intentionally ambiguous and understanding their meaning
requires active inference by the viewer, we submit that the
affectivity condition (for empathy) is met even when a viewer’s
response does not match the most plausible interpretation of the
depicted state.1
The title of the article, “empathy-related responses” is
chosen deliberately to embrace both empathy and the closely
related phenomenon of compassion or empathic concern, whose
distinct behavioral and neuronal profiles have been increasingly
acknowledged by some theorists (Bernhardt and Singer, 2012;
Klimecki et al., 2013; Singer and Klimecki, 2014). A viewer’s
reaction to the depicted suffering and misfortune of others can
incorporate either self-oriented empathic distress (feeling with
the depicted figures), or other-oriented compassion (feeling for
them), or in most cases, some combination of both components.
Importantly for works of visual art, in both aspects the empathic
response may in some cases (most frequently in self-portraits)
extend from real or imaginary depicted person(s) to the artist,
whose presence is either enacted in the image or implied by
contextual information.
Empathic response is commonly understood to be strongly
modulated both by context and by individual personal
characteristics. The main modulating factors, as a number
of neuroimaging studies has revealed, include: the intensity of
displayed emotion, the appraisal of a situation, the characteristics
of the person suffering, attention, the personality traits of the
empathizer, previous experience of situations that inflict pain,
the degree of attachment to the target, the degree of potential
vulnerability or helplessness of an object (Watt, 2005; Gu and
Han, 2007; Hein and Singer, 2008; Bernhardt and Singer, 2012;
Rameson et al., 2012; Gonzalez-Liencres et al., 2013). The
empathic response to visual art works is similarly subject to
manifold top-down appraisals and modulations. In what follows
we focus on three key factors: (i) contextual framing, which
can include various modes of priming by narratives and other
images and which co-determines patterns of visual exploration
of the image; (ii) a unique combination of the personal
dispositions of the beholder; and (iii) the characteristics of the
1In discussing “the affectivity condition” (for empathy to occur), Shaun Gallagher
highlights the inherent difficulties involved in specifying[determining] the affective
state of the observer of a person suffering (Gallagher, 2012, 374–375). We follow
Decety and Jackson’s (2004, 73) view that an affective response to another person
(as one of the principal components of empathy) often, but not always, entails
sharing that person’s affective state. However, a more comprehensive discussion
of this point is beyond the scope of this article.
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image, including the nature and format of the representational
medium.
CONTEXTUAL FRAMING: PICTORIAL,
SPATIAL-EXPERIENTIAL, AND CULTURAL
CONTEXTS
The crucial role of context in social cognition generally and
empathic response specifically has received increasing attention
lately (e.g., Bernhardt and Singer, 2012; Ibañez and Manes,
2012; Melloni et al., 2014). Likewise, the central role of context
in art experience is well-established and recent neurocognitive
models of art experience highlight the importance of various
contextual factors (e.g., Jacobsen, 2006; Bullot and Reber, 2013;
Redies, 2015). A number of studies in experimental esthetics
have examined various forms of text-based contextual priming
(e.g., Millis, 2001; Leder et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2006; Kirk
et al., 2009; Noguchi and Murota, 2013; Swami, 2013; Gerger
et al., 2014; Silveira et al., 2015), as well as effects of spatial and
institutional settings (Brieber et al., 2014, 2015; Krukar, 2014)
on art appreciation and experience. For the present purpose, we
suggest that three contextual frames must be distinguished: first,
the pictorial context of the image, i.e., the relationship of the
emotionally salient aspects (affective affordances) to the pictorial
field or structure as a whole; second, the spatial and experiential
context of the presentation of the image; and third, the cultural-
social context of the actual experiential situation, in which the
viewer’s personal dispositions interact with cultural factors and
form expectations. To address the complexities of the contextual
priming of empathic response to depicted pain and physical
suffering, we now turn to considering a specific example of an
art work—The Blinding of Samson by Rembrandt from 1,636
(Figure 1). The subject of the painting is the biblical story of
the blinding of Samson by the Philistines, which focuses on the
cataclysmic effect of agony and on the moment when the actual
mutilation takes place. Several authors have highlighted the
emotional appeal and effectiveness of the painting. Asmemorably
phrased by art historian Kenneth Clark: “The Blinding of Samson
is an extremely disturbing picture. Only a man of genius could have
done anything so consistently horrifying. Apart from the revolting
realism of the actual blinding, every detail, every hand and foot, is
ugly in itself ” (Clark, 1966, p.20). Other commentators describe
the depicted scene as “gory” and as a “drama of extreme brutality”
(Perlove and Silver, 2009, p.113), while the author of one of the
many monographs on Rembrandt specifically notes that “...in
front of this picture we realize the unique power of [Rembrandt’s]
empathy” (Štech V. V., 1966, p.73).
Recall now the argument that “embodied simulation enables
the direct experiential understanding of the intentional and
emotional contents of images...” (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007,
emphasis added). But what does this “direct experiential
understanding” amount to in the case of the viewer looking at
Blinding? We can begin by comparing such a “disturbing and
horrifying” image that has the status of an artistic masterpiece to
the kind of “emotionally negative” or “aversive” visual stimulus
typically used in neuroimaging experiments on pain empathy,
FIGURE 1 | Rembrandt, Blinding of Samson, oil on canvas, 1636. Image
source: Wikimedia Commons library.
such as a naturalistic photograph of a needle being inserted into
a hand (Lamm et al., 2007b; Ogino et al., 2007). The sensation
of pain inflicted by a needle in a medical procedure will have
been endured by most modern-day adults, who then will be able
to directly access a vicarious feeling of such a sensation. On the
other hand, the physical pain and mental suffering of having
one’s eyesight violently destroyed is (mercifully) outside the scope
of personal experience of almost anyone who encounters The
Blinding of Samson.
In the presumed empathic resonance with Samson (or the
pain of a victim of similar such drastic images, such as Goya’s
Disasters of War or Nicolas Poussin’s Martyrdom), the viewer
can merely evoke a pain caused by whatever trauma to the
body or given part of the body (s)he himself has encountered,
which then has to be amplified through intentional empathic
projection (De Greck et al., 2012) in order to model such
unthinkable suffering. But there is obviously more to the depicted
scene. Anyone who lost their eyesight through violence would
be simultaneously thrust into a mental state of fear, desperation,
distress, anger, and possibly many other feelings, that would
compound the experience of pain (Price, 2000; Auvray et al.,
2010), and this again is something that can only be approximated
by the imagination. In fact, Samson’s head represents a Gestalt,
which encodes both the sensory and the affective components
of pain (Kunz et al., 2012) and the effects of his fateful struggle.
Thus, even in such persuasive depictions of pain, the experiential
understanding, far from being automatic, and direct, appears to
involve massive intentional projections by the viewer.
Pictorial Context
A major factor that constrains the nature of the empathic
response to Samson’s fate has to do with how the most
emotionally salient aspects of the scene—what we shall label
affective affordances (Fuchs and Koch, 2014; Kesner, 2014, see
BOX)—are embedded within the overall pictorial space of the
painting. In contrast to stimuli typically used in neuroimaging
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experiments on empathy for pain (e.g., an image showing a limb
against the minimal background of a sheet of tissue, exhibiting
uniform tonality and no texture, such as in an experiment
by Ogino et al., 2007), in Rembrandt’s painting, the relative
placement of the main affective affordances within the entire
pictorial composition assumes critical significance. The crucial
details of Samson’s head, with a dagger being driven into his right
eye and blood and fluids oozing out, comprises roughly 1% of the
entire pictorial field. Its imminent context is the struggling body
of Samson, composed of a congruent body posture and facial
expression. The perception of emotion conveyed by Samson’s
face is systematically influenced by the emotion expressed by his
struggling body (on the contextual factors of the perception of
emotional facial expression, see Meeren et al., 2005; Righart and
De Gelder, 2008; Barrett et al., 2011; Wieser and Brosch, 2012;
Kret et al., 2013).
In attending to and scanning The Blinding, the detail of the
head is a strong attractor. Nevertheless, it competes with other
points of interest, both at the level of pictorial detail and the
composition as a whole. The Blinding makes for perceptually
an extremely complex scene. To make a quick and incomplete
list of the affective and visual affordances vying with Samson’s
head for attention: on the level of objects, there are the faces and
gazes of no fewer than five other figures, as well as their bodies,
captured in dynamic movements and gestures, plus a number of
other static objects. On the level of pictorial aspects, there is an
interweaving of contrasts of light, from dramatic light to deep
shadows, often set against each other, the color and texture of the
clothes, or the metallic luster of the armor. Finally, there is the
effect of the entire spatial setting of the composition, which both
integrates the individual virtual objects depicted and addresses
the viewer with its own dynamism. The composition enacts a
dense interrelationship between the human figures depicted: on a
phenomenological level, scanning away from Samson’s agony to
other figures and faces and/or other visual-semantic affordances
provides a respite from direct engagement with the details of
a painful situation (and thus could be described as down-
regulating empathic response). At the same time, it is the viewer’s
unfolding awareness of these other figures’ actions in relation
to Samson’s body that may reactivate empathic response to his
suffering.
The active viewer inevitably negotiating his distance from
the picture will thus be shifting between emotionally charged
areas (affective affordances) and other points of visual interest
or saliency. As recent eye-tracking studies have demonstrated,
the eye initially tends to fixate on emotional objects rather than
on other salient but emotionally neutral ones, and emotional
saliency can override visual saliency that is defined by such
features as intensity, color, and orientation (Humphrey et al.,
2012; Massaro et al., 2012; Niu et al., 2012). The more closely
the viewer attends to the picture plane, the greater the likelihood
that his attention will be drawn to the surface of the painting,
its texture and (other) visually salient features: e.g., the relative
intensity of the tone, the distinctiveness or sharpness of the
plane edges, optical differences, the way in which the depicted
scenes and objects emerge from Rembrandt’s handling of the
medium. (The interaction between socio-affective/cognitive and
esthetic processing will be discussed further in Section An
Integrated Model of Empathy-Related Responses to Figural
Artworks).
The Spatial-Experiential and Cultural
Contexts
The experience of any art work is decisively shaped by the
space in which it is presented. The viewer, by actively exercising
her art viewing skills within the spatial/presentational context,
determines and modulates the perception of affective affordances
within the picture. The character and nature of empathic
response will thus significantly depend on how a person goes
about perceptually exploring the art work, involving both the
movement of the body in relation to the painting’s surface
and scanning patterns exercised from a certain point in front
of the picture. The viewer’s individual pattern of sensory-
motor response to an image directly impacts on processes
of emotion-regulation and reappraisal, thereby co-determining
the nature of the empathic response for the duration of the
viewing period and shaping the process by which the picture
is interpreted within the framework outlined in section An
Integrated Model of Empathy-Related Responses to Figural
Artworks. Moreover, the spatial-experiential context significantly
shapes the response by providing various means of top-down
influence and priming. Emerging evidence points to the role of
context-specific information (such as titles of works, labels, and
other texts) in making sense and in the appreciation of works of
art (Leder et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2006; Kapoula et al., 2009;
Silveira et al., 2015). The affective and empathic response to
works of art is influenced by texts and narratives on two levels,
with semantic information (i) directly guiding the patterns of
attention and visual exploration of the work and (ii) providing
an overall interpretative and evaluative framework within which
the encounter with the work takes place. To provide a specific
example, we shall briefly consider another art work—Giotto’s
Lamentation in the Scrovegni Chapel in Padua—as an example of
a large category of medieval religious imagery, which can be said
to contain a specific “script for action,” for an embodied reaction
(Figure 2).
It has been well-established by art historians that scenes
of the Passion of Christ, lamentations and other instances of
social pain2 were efficacious in their original viewing conditions,
often eliciting strong emotional responses in their viewers that
were manifested in reactions such as weeping, kissing wounds,
receiving stigmata, and other forms of embodied response
(Belting, 1981; Ringbom, 1984; Freedberg, 1989; Bennett, 2001;
Stevenson, 2010). One such account describes the response
of Dominican writer Henry Suso’s (1295–1366) mother when
contemplating images in the Cathedral of Constance during
Lent (as quoted in Hamburger, 1998, p. 237): “From pious
contemplation of the worthy suffering of Christ, she felt in an
acute manner the great pain that the compassionate mother
of God experienced under the cross. And from her sensitivity
to this aﬄiction she fell ill in her body, so that she sank
2Here we take the standard definition of social pain as painful feelings arising from
social rejection, exclusion, or loss of a loved one (see Eisenberg, 2015 for a review).
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BOX 1 | Affective affordance.
We define affective affordance as that component of the image that allows the affective and empathic response to unfold. It is comprised of both the low-level
visual properties and the high-level intentional properties of an image. Affective affordances operate on several levels: (i) the level of virtual (depicted) objects and
components thereof; (ii) the level of the elements that constitute the representational medium (the image-vehicle)—such as line, brushstrokes, or color; (iii) the level
of the overall pictorial structure and composition. The affective salience of human bodies and faces depicted in works of art are always inherently enacted by how
the artist works with the artistic medium. In some cases, the artist’s intention complicates the activation of affective affordances, whereby the difference between a
viewer’s response to a real salient object (such as e.g., a face, or a gesture) and their response to a particular depiction of the object constitutes the artwork’s esthetic
effect (Kesner, 2016). Alongside body postures and gestures, the most important affective (and potentially social) affordances in a visual image are gaze and facial
expression and their mutual interaction (see Graham and LaBar, 2012; Rigato and Farroni, 2013 for a review).
FIGURE 2 | Giotto di Bondone, Lamentation of Christ, Scrovegni
chapel, Padua, wall painting, ca 1305. Image source: Wikimedia Commons
library.
to the earth in a dead faint”. Devotional images were often
encountered within a hierotopy (Lidov, 2006)—a multisensory
space in which architecture, light, auditory and olfactory
sensations all intermingled with the visual experience of images
during liturgical ceremonies. Moreover, during communal
worship the viewing of images was typically mediated and
manipulated by the clergy—by the spoken exegesis of the
priest—and even when contemplated privately the viewing of
an image was often circumscribed by instructions in psalters,
prayer books and paraliturgical compendia, which sometimes
included specific instructions on where to direct the gaze
(see Hamburger, 1998, p. 80–93). Priming by other sensory
impressions and/or spoken or written words thereby functioned
to target the gaze and to activate affective affordances within
the image. Furthermore, especially in the setting of communal
worship, the affective and empathic response was not just primed
by words, but also by the socially sanctioned expectations of
appropriate emotional display and behavior.
Such modulation and priming amounted to a comprehensive
reappraisal and inferences based on historical facts can be thus
assessed in the light of contemporary research on affective
reappraisal (Wu et al., 2012; Lindquist and Gendron, 2013).
Although experimentally verified evidence cannot be provided in
the case of past audiences, it is plausible to speculate that semantic
priming by words and liturgy may have served to identify and
appraise affective affordances, co-determining the exogenous
orienting of eye-scanning patterns, attentional allocation, or
patterns of glancing vs. prolonged gazing at an image. Taking into
account emerging evidence that empathic reaction, particularly
the cognitive component, is modulated by the perceived closeness
and relationship to the people depicted and affective resonance
is limited to close others and extends to outgroup people only
with active effort (e.g., Gutsell and Inzlicht, 2012; Eres and
Molenberghs, 2013; Meyer et al., 2013), it is furthermore likely
that affective resonance served to narrow the empathy gap
between the observers and the persons depicted. In sum, priming
by spoken or written words and implicit social norms offers
an analogy to the regulation strategies used in contemporary
experiments: instructions given to subjects to imagine themselves
or loved ones in a depicted situation in order to heighten
the sense of personal experience (Ochsner et al., 2004; Lamm
et al., 2007a; Bebko et al., 2011). Importantly, many instances of
contemporary audiences’ encounters with pre-modern imagery
of social pain are likewise cases of communal experience, in
which listening to a live (a companion, a guide, a teacher) or
recorded (audioguide) narrative decisively shapes the parameters
of the visual encounter and hence how the experience unfolds. To
sum up, both the original viewers and the modern-day audience
are significantly pre-tuned by mutually dependent factors of their
mind-set (participation in the framework of culturally sanctioned
actions) and experiential and contextual situation. But crucially,
both these factors are constrained by and only unfold through a
third factor, namely, the nature of the representational medium
that presents the target of the empathic response (as will be
discussed in Section The Role of the Representational Medium
and the Reality-Effect in Empathic Response).
PERSONAL FACTORS MODULATING THE
EMPATHIC RESPONSE TO WORKS OF ART
An increasing body of evidence points to the crucial role of
inter-subjective variation in the profile and the unfolding of
both empathy-related responses and art experience. A number of
neuroimaging experiments have demonstrated that the empathic
response to the pain and emotions of others is modulated
by personality traits and affective and cognitive styles (e.g.,
Avenanti et al., 2009; Calder et al., 2011; Lai et al., 2012).
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Trait and state anxiety, in particular, has been found to
correlate with the magnitude of the response to emotional
stimuli (Etkin et al., 2004; McTeague et al., 2011; Ball et al.,
2012; Wangelin et al., 2012). At the same time, the crucial
importance of art expertise for esthetic processing has been
amply documented (e.g., Pihko et al., 2011; Leder et al., 2012;
Pang et al., 2013; Else et al., 2015). Based on these and other
findings, we suggest that the individual profile of empathic
response to a work of art will depend on the interaction of
five factors: first, the individual characteristics of the subject
(including his/her age, gender, parenthood, his/her role as
caregiver etc., and previous experience with depicted pain or
misfortune); second, the subject’s dispositional empathy (Davis,
1983), defined as the viewer’s responsiveness to the observed
experiences of others, has been found to correlate with the
frequency and magnitude of empathic response (Davis, 1996;
Avenanti et al., 2009); third, the subject’s cultural-cognitive
competence in relation to the experiential situation; fourth, the
intergroup empathy bias, that is, the perceived closeness and
relationship to the person or people depicted; and fifth, the
momentary psychosomatic state of the observer. The critical
among these variables are dispositional empathy and cultural-
cognitive competence.
The culture-cognitive competence, which we take to be
broader in scope than “expertise,” incorporating experience,
skills and knowledge related to viewing art works and making
sense of cultural products, may be the most important personal
characteristic. Both the viewing of art and empathy (in some
descriptions) are a type of skill, and in the experience of art
they mutually reinforce each other. Importantly, higher cultural-
cognitive competence (Kesner, 2006) need not correlate with a
stronger empathic response and may in fact prove constraining
and inhibit the empathic response. The viewer’s knowledge
that (s)he is looking at a masterpiece by an acknowledged
artistic genius and her culturally-ingrained expectations vis-à-
vis such a great work of art—for example, that one’s experience
should primarily be one of wonder at and appreciation of
the artistic accomplishment, rather than a direct, bodily-
mediated reaction—will likely affect the patterns of scanning
and attentional allocation (e.g., prioritizing visual-semantic
saliences related to esthetic meaning over affective affordances),
thus circumventing and down-regulating the development of
imminent, bodily-mediated reactions. In a similar vein, if the
viewer’s mind is focusing on an art-historical interpretation
of the intended message of the painting (e.g., to offer an
insight into biblical metaphor when Samson’s suffering is to be
understood as opening the path to his redemption, and blindness
becomes a prerequisite for spiritual vision; see Perlove and Silver,
2009, p.113) this semantic knowledge may strongly modulate
the empathic reaction in the sense of a down-regulation and
reappraisal of affective feelings for Samson as the victim of
horrendous mutilation. In an optimal scenario, the developed
skills of viewing and making sense of art allow a flexibility of
response response, which can range between empathy-related
and esthetic aspects of experience (as we detail in section
An Integrated Model of Empathy-Related Responses to Figural
Artworks).
THE ROLE OF THE REPRESENTATIONAL
MEDIUM AND THE REALITY-EFFECT IN
EMPATHIC RESPONSE
Current accounts of the empathic response to art do
not sufficiently consider the crucial role played by the
mediating effect of the representational medium. However,
any comprehensive account of empathic response to art needs to
take into account how the contextual and relational modulation
of empathic response is realized vis-à-vis the interaction of
the viewer with the particular medium of representation. To
begin with, there is an obvious difference between the response
to an observed real event unfolding before the subject and a
depicted event.3 Observing representation provides a different
set of affordances for the viewer’s engagement than being present
at the scene of real-life suffering. Consequently, every visual
image modulates the empathic response by the simple fact of its
being decoupled from the here and now of actually observing an
event live, and this is true even in the case of live TV or online
broadcasting. Interestingly, this distinction was already taken for
granted a long time ago by medieval theologians, who argued
that the image might be a more efficient model and stimulus for
spiritual movement than the observed behavior of living people
(Jezler, 1983).
Perhaps the key question related to our topic here concerns
the problem of to what extent the capacity of an artistic or a
non-artistic image to elicit an empathic response depends on
the viewer’s belief in the psychological reality of the depicted
event—of the presence of real or fictional characters and the
reality of their pain and suffering. This “reality effect” is related to
the phenomenon of immersion or absorption in fiction, defined
as a vicarious experiencing of events and emotions in fictional
representation as if they were real (Walton, 1990; Oatley, 1999).
Links between fictional narratives provided by texts, cinema or
computer games and empathy have been extensively discussed
(e.g., Coplan, 2004; Mar and Oatley, 2008; Mar et al., 2011; Tamir
et al., 2016). As Oatley (1999) points out, a prerequisite for
the development of empathic skills is emotional transportation
into the story. The narrative itself acts to evoke and transform
emotions, both directly through the events and characters
depicted and (indirectly) through the cueing of emotionally
valenced memories. Once evoked by the story, these emotions
can in turn influence a person’s experience of the narrative (Mar
et al., 2011). To be effective, a narrative world has to be real within
its context in order to instigate imaginative projections (Green,
2004; Bal and Veltkamp, 2013), that is, the ability to experience
the narrative depends on the viewer’s subjective feeling of being
a witness to the depicted scene. Related evidence suggests that
3In neuroimaging experiments based on “direct observation” of painful stimuli
delivered to the bodies of other people or painful social situations affecting
other people, the (response) effect invariably occurs when the viewer is presented
with photographs, video clips, or other graphic materials, which are intrinsically
assumed to be transparent media that straightforwardly present the event as if
it were real. In fact, however, such experiments cannot be said to assess the
psychological and neuronal dimension of the reaction involved in “witnessing live
a painful event” or “directly witnessing a live person,” as they claim to do (Bruneau
et al., 2012).
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subjects’ emotional reactions to unpleasant images as indexed
by psychophysiological parameters are attenuated if the subjects
perceive the depicted scenes as fictitious instead of real (Mocaiber
et al., 2010, 2011). On the other hand, we submit that empathic
response does not require that the viewer identify with the
depicted character (a detailed discussion of the identification
aspect is beyond the scope of this paper, but for a discussion of
identification with characters in literature, see Zillmann, 1994;
Keen, 2006).
However, the specific role played by different visual media
in staging the reality effect or witness perspective for the
beholder remains little understood. In some cases, the viewer’s
implicit belief in the mimetic transparency of the medium elicits
in her a subjective sense of being a witness to the depicted
scene. Thus, for the observer of medieval images the painting
may have had roughly the kind of documentary value that
photographic or video-documentary images do for viewers today.
Historical evidence suggests that religious images (augmented by
narratives) often served to transport the viewer into the time and
space of the depicted event or even to change his/her status from
that of a viewer to that of a participant (e.g., Lentes, 2000). Such
transient immersion in the fictional world likely intensified the
empathic response. Tomakemattersmore complicated, however,
the adoption of a witness perspective may, or in other instances
may not, be related to the degree of verisimilitude (“realism”)
with which the medium presents the depicted characters and
events. No direct correlation can be established between the
phenomenally felt vividness of the depicted event for the viewer
and the realism of the image-vehicle. That much is suggested
by neuroimaging studies on empathy for pain or social pain
that utilized distinctly unnaturalistic stimuli such as computer-
generated figures (Masten et al., 2011; Meyer et al., 2013, 2015)
or sketches (Krach et al., 2011), yet caused participants to
perceive others as active, salient, and significant persons. Other
experiments using low-fidelity computer avatars confirm that
subjects are capable of interacting with them on phenomenal,
behavioral and neuronal levels as if they were real, despite
their cognitive knowledge that they are not (Slater et al., 2006;
Cheetham et al., 2009). Slater et al.’s observation (2006: p. 6)
that the perceptual and neural mechanisms that underlie such a
response are largely unexplored still holds true. Thus, manifestly
unrealistic (stylized) works of art that proclaim their status
as fiction may have the ability to stage a reality effect for
a viewer in a particular observational context and trigger an
empathic response as effectively as do media that are perceived
as providing documentary evidence. On the other hand, there
is some evidence that the empathic response to visual stimuli
does to some extent depend on the modality through which
the image is conveyed. Several studies comparing empathic
reactions, measured as the brain activity in subjects observing
painful situations in photographs and cartoons, concluded that
the neural activity linked to empathy for pain decreased when
the reality of the painful stimuli was reduced by presenting
painful stimulation in cartoon form (Han et al., 2005; Gu and
Han, 2007). Similar results were recently obtained for moving
images, where neuronal correlates of emotional empathy were
observed in (viewers of) live-action movies, but not in (viewers
of) animated movies (Vemuri and Surampudi, 2015). Further
elucidating the relationship between the behavioral and neuronal
indices of empathic response to the image and the reality effect
subjectively perceived by the viewer clearly remains a major goal
for future research.
AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF
EMPATHY-RELATED RESPONSES TO
FIGURAL ARTWORKS
While neuroimaging research on empathy typically focuses on
isolating empathic response to visual (or other) stimuli, the
empathy-related response to visual art work does not, as a
rule, occur in isolation but is embedded within the overall
experience or the making sense of an image. Therefore, it is
necessary to consider how empathic response is related to the
overall experience of the viewer—both in a naturalistic and in an
experimental setting. We begin by briefly contrasting a response
to a work of art vs. a non-artistic image. Empathic concern and
response is generally taken as a precursor and motivation for
prosocial, altruistic behavior (Batson, 1991; Preston and deWaal,
2002) and much recent research has focused on investigating
the perception-action cascade in empathy (e.g., Mathur et al.,
2010; Masten et al., 2011; Zanon et al., 2014). When a person
observes non-artistic images (such as media representations) of
suffering, the empathic distress elicited by the depicted pain and
misfortune of real people may translate into empathic concern
and ultimately to some form of prosocial or altruistic behavior:
the viewer donates money or tries in some other way to alleviate
the ordeal of the depicted victims. Making sense of the image has
thus an other-directed prosocial behavior as a tangible output
(for a good example of this, see Lieberman, 2013, p. 151–152).
On the other hand, when art works are viewed in a museum,
this tight coupling of perception and action does not occur,
no imminent behavioral reaction to the pain or the negative
emotions of the depicted figures is produced. Shaun Gallagher
describes the embodied response to art works as an “affordance
short-circuit,” which is “.. a kinaesthetic-anticipatory response to
a non-realizable (non-practical, non-interactionable) affordance,
..... an opportunity for experience of the purely possible or maybe
even the impossible” (Gallagher, 2011, p. 108–109). How can
the embedding of the empathic response within the broader
art experience be conceptualized?4 We would argue that the
experience of empathy-eliciting figural art works prompts a
dynamic and fluctuating interaction between two interlinked
sets of processes: socio-affective/cognitive processing, related to
the person perception, which includes one or more domains
of empathy and the theory of mind (Blakemore and Frith,
2003; Lieberman, 2007; Ochsner, 2008; Adolphs, 2010; Freeman
et al., 2012; Stanley and Adolphs, 2013), and esthetic processing,
primarily concerned with esthetic appreciation and the judgment
of and attention to non-social aspects of the image. Unlike
4Here we maintain the important distinction between related, yet conceptually
distinct notions of art experience and esthetic experience (Palmer et al., 2013). For
the purpose of the present discussion we take “esthetic processing” to refer to a
range of cognitive and affective mechanisms as detailed below.
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the naturalistic socio-emotional cognition of people, which is
typically based on the integration of multimodal cues, (Freeman
et al., 2012; Zaki, 2013), here the cues (or affordances) are
unimodal, that is, visual. Rather than integrating multimodal
cues, an encounter with a figural work of art allows the viewer
to focus on the deeper processing offered by a single (visual)
modality. In a figural depiction, any affective/social affordance
enacted by a painting or sculpture at the same time offers itself
as an artistic/esthetic affordance.
A Model of Empathy within Art Experience
Having discussed several critical factors relating to empathic
response to figural depiction, we now turn to outlining an
integratedmodel of empathy-related response to figural art work.
We present it as a heuristic device that seeks to organize the
multiplicity of factors that determine emphatic response and to
capture the embedding of empathy-related response within the
broader art (pictorial) experience. The model represents—in a
necessarily abstract manner—the engagement of a viewer with
both original figural art work and its reproduction in either a
private viewing situation or an experimental setting (Figure 3).
The model is envisioned as functioning as follows:
• The viewer, with his or her distinct combination of
dispositions (including, most importantly, dispositional
empathy and cultural-cognitive competence, see Section
Personal Factors Modulating the Empathic Response to
Works of Art) engages with a work of art in a specific
spatial-experiential context. The context modulates how the
empathic response unfolds within the overall art experience
by creating the spatial constraints of viewing, imposing
cultural associations and especially by providing the semantic
framework (mostly various forms of top-down priming
conditions) of the perceptual encounter (as discussed above
Section Contextual Framing: Pictorial, Spatial-Experiential,
and Cultural Contexts).
• The specific pattern of interaction (i) between different
empathy-related mechanisms and (ii) between socio-
affective/cognitive and esthetic processing as the experience
unfolds is simultaneously co-determined by the specific
features of the image. These include: the presentation format,
the placement of the figures within the (pictorial) composition
(2D images), or the viewing space (3D images), the specific
configuration of emotional body clues (gestures, postures), the
depicted action, the arousal and valence of emotion embodied
by the figure(s), the presence/absence of eye contact with the
figure(s), the degree of verisimilitude (realism) and the relative
prominence of particular aspects of the representational
medium (color, materiality, brushwork etc.). Predictably,
other factors being equal, such image characteristics alone
may strongly affect the specific patterns of response on a
psychological and neural level. Thus, paintings like Blinding,
with its dynamic composition of figures and its depiction
of bodily mutilation, pain and violent action, will be likely
to elicit motor empathy and affective pain empathy that are
mediated by a pain matrix and action-observation (or mirror)
network. On the other hand, as recent experimental evidence
suggests, portraits of subjects with emotional expressions
who establish eye contact with the viewer /Figure 4/ are more
likely to elicit affective empathy and mentalizing (Kesner
et al. submitted). Likewise, the relative prominence of the
medium at the expense of the realism of the depicted figures
may weaken the empathic response. Importantly, all the key
variables co-determining the course and magnitude of the
empathic response (especially semantic priming, and features
of the images) can be experimentally manipulated, thus
allowing for empirical testing of the model.
• The relative magnitude of the empathy-related process and
the interaction between socio-affective and esthetic processing
is from the inception of the perceptual encounter further
modulated by the features of the viewer’s unfolding response:
his/her implicit belief in the reality of the depicted event (or
the witness perspective, as discussed in Section The Role of the
Representational Medium and the Reality-Effect in Empathic
Response), the viewer’s like/dislike of the protagonists and
understanding of the depicted scene or plot. The interaction
between socio-affective/cognitive and esthetic processing as a
key aspect of the model is further explored below (Patterns
of Interaction between Socio-Affective/Cognitive and Esthetic
Processing).
• While none of the factors listed in the diagram in isolation
constitutes a necessary or sufficient condition for empathic
response to occur, the co-occurrence of key factors will in
most cases be a sufficient condition for the empathic response
to develop. As a critical feature we single out priming by
narratives (or by task/procedure in experimental condition
among contextual factors and the presence of highly salient
emotional cues in the image, along with direct gaze and effects
of the medium that help to enact a witness perspective in a
viewer’s mind. Depending on their particular combination, the
specific pattern of processing ensues, which may take the form
of a learned or ritualized “action script” or highly individual,
even idiosyncratic response.
• One or more modes of empathic engagements (kinesthetic-
motor resonance, affective sharing, cognitive empathy,
compassion) depend on and are intertwined with a multitude
of other psychological mechanisms, subserving both socio-
affective/cognitive and esthetic processing. These involve both
reflexive (automatic) and reflective (controlled, volitional, and
effortful) processes:
Socio-affective/cognitive
processing
Esthetic processing
Attentional mechanisms
Semantic interpretation
Reappraisal
Self-reference processing
Face and body emotional
cues processing
Enhanced perceptual processing
Gaze detection Cue disparity detection
Social categorization Evaluative judgments/esthetic
appraisal
Emotional recognition Associations generation
Memory processes
Episodic simulation
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FIGURE 3 | A model of empathy-related response to figural art work. Underlined text indicates the critical factors. Double arrows in the rightmost box indicate
the bi-directional interaction between socio affective/cognitive and esthetic processing.
• Finally, while our focus here has been on response to
works of art, the model equally applies to response to other
empathy-eliciting depictions with non-art status that are
circulating in the wider visual culture. For instance, viewing
multiple representations of suffering in the media that are
primarily intended to communicate information and elicit
emotional/empathic reactions in their viewers /Figure 5/ may
likewise involve an esthetic appraisal, whereby there occurs
an interaction between socio-affective/cognitive and esthetic
processing.
Patterns of Interaction between
Socio-Affective/Cognitive and Esthetic
Processing
As described (above), it is always the specific interaction of given
image characteristics, personal and contextual factors, as outlined
above, that determines the mutual bi-directional interaction
between socio-affective/cognitive and esthetic processes for the
duration of the encounter. In some situations one of the two
responses (affective/empathy-related vs. esthetic) may prevail
and dominate the experience. An example would be the case
of a medieval audience responding emotionally to scenes of
the Passion of Christ discussed above, or instances of people
talking to portraits, or of people being sexually aroused by
statues (Pygmalionism). There is ample (and psychologically
relevant) evidence from art history and criticism, anthropology
and literature testifying to the occurrence of various affective
and sexual responses to depicted persons as if they were
real. In the case of sculpture in particular the encounter is
often intercorporeal, intersubjective and reactive (Stoichita, 2008;
Getsy, 2014). What works of art afford is the possibility to
switch—within a focused and sustained viewing experience—
between the first-person, observational stance and second-person
interactive engagement. At the opposite extreme, the experience
of images such as Blinding, which manifestly solicit an embodied
empathic understanding, may in some cases proceed on the level
of an appreciation of the work’s formal and semantic qualities,
without any affective-empathic response. In the case of modern-
day viewers, many encounters with empathy-eliciting artworks
are probably too brief and superficial for the experience to be able
to develop significantly along either trajectory, so that it remains
limited to a basic semantic understanding of what the work
depicts (as discussed in Kesner, 2014). In the optimal scenario,
however, an ongoing encounter with a complex, empathy-
eliciting artwork produces a looping or “seesaw” effect, in which
the dominance of one aspect gives way to the dominance of
another, and they support each other in a mutually reinforcing
cycle.
Importantly, our model does not assume that the empathic
response develops along any fixed trajectory from affective
resonance to cognitively mediated understanding. There is
no behavioral evidence for the presumed automaticity of
embodied simulation in viewing artworks and no default
direction for empathic reaction from (what embodied simulation
theorists label) “automatic empathic response as a basic level of
response” (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007) to cognitively elaborated
empathizing with the situation of the depicted persons should
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FIGURE 4 | Zbyneˇk Sekal, Self-portrait, drawing, 1946. With kind
permission of Arbor Vitae Publishers.
be posited. Observing museum visitors suggests that if anything
like an “automatic” or “basic level of” response to a work of art
(on the automatic processing in cognition, see Moors and De
Houwer, 2006) can be postulated in relation to viewing a work of
art, then that response has to do with the perceptual and semantic
understanding of the image—recognizing/identifying the subject
and conceptually labeling the depicted scene and persons or
event. On the contrary, as subjective accounts of experiences
suggest, often there is a gradual process of conscious making
sense of or coming to terms with the image that extends over a
protracted period of viewing, which then opens the possibility
for a full-blown empathic response that ultimately incorporates
bodily affective resonance, imaginative projection, and feelings of
distress and/or sympathy and compassion.
The mutual interaction of socio-affective/cognitive and
esthetic processing can proceed in a number of ways, for example
(i) when the viewer shifts his/her attention from the depicted
human targets to other aspects of the composition (as described
above in the case study of Blinding)—such attention shifting can
be experimentally ascertained by eye-tracking measurements);
or (ii) when the viewer encounters depicted faces and bodies
that elicit empathy-related responses and are at the same time
esthetically appraised as being beautiful or ugly (cf. as quoted
above with reference to the Blinding of Samson: “Apart from
the revolting realism of the actual blinding, every detail, every
hand and foot, is ugly in itself ”.; for an esthetic appraisal of
FIGURE 5 | Filip Singer, from a series Migration Crisis-Lesbos, 2015.
With kind permission of the author.
human bodies, cf. Martín-Loeches et al., 2014; Candidi and
Aglioti, 2015); or (iii) when the affective/empathic response to
the depicted figures and the esthetic appraisal of the picture as
a whole proceeds in a bi-directional exchange or continuous
loop. For instance, the very formation of an “emotion percept,”
which in real-life social vision involves the rapid integration
of compound social cues (Adams and Kveraga, 2015; Marchi
and Newen, 2015), will in pictorial perception often evolve
into an esthetic appraisal that is concerned with detecting and
analyzing incongruences between compound social-emotional
cues, such as facial expression, gaze, bodily posture, and gesture
(such ambiguities often constituting the artistic intention of the
image). Once formed, a cognitively elaborated emotion-percept
will stimulate further esthetic appraisal, or it will trigger an
empathic resonance in the viewer.
Furthermore, in images that present scenes of one or more
interacting figures but offer no direct clue as to the nature of their
relationship or the meaning of the pictured event, it is mostly
the intentional operation of understanding the circumstances
of depicted persons as a necessary precondition for affective
resonance and embodied empathic understanding (in both its
aspects, i.e., feeling as and feeling for the depicted target). In
such cases, it is the viewer’s access to some sort of extra-
pictorial semantic information and the grasp of the meaning
of the depicted situation that both prompts mental simulation
and provides clues that lead to a deeper emotional/empathic
processing (for a case study of this process in a specific
work of art, see Kesner, 2014). Furthermore, as Zillmann
(1991) suggested, empathy may be mediated by morally derived
affective dispositions toward the target, which again argues
against the notion that the empathic response to an image
automatically takes precedence Art-historical/critical literature
(which, as a rule, continues to be ignored by neuroesthetics
research) and literary sources contain a massive amount of
revealing evidence of the existence of this kind of “seesaw”
effect, a shifting awareness between being confronted with
a (depicted) human person and being confronted with an
esthetic object (e.g., Herder, 1778; Riegl, 1902; Steinberg, 1988;
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Stoichita, 2008; Sidlauskas, 2009 to cite some very different
examples).
Secondly, in a deep encounter with an empathy-eliciting art
work, empathic distress (feeling like the depicted persons) and
compassion (feeling for them) will be typically accompanied
by a range of mental states that add to the phenomenological
complexity of the experience of art. Depending on the particular
work of art and the interaction of factors described in the
model, (these mental states) may include basic emotions
and complex affective states, such as being moved (Hanich
et al., 2014), “feeling like crying” (Pelowski, 2015) or morbid
fascination (Oosterwijk et al., 2016), but they can also include
specific esthetic emotions. Negative emotions and empathic
distress, although subjectively felt as something disquieting and
distressing, may ultimately be consciously reappraised in positive
terms so that the entire experience is remembered as enjoyable
(the “enjoyment of tragedy” phenomenon, cf. De Wied et al.,
1994) and transformative (Pelowski and Akiba, 2011), hence
rewarding and motivating further encounters of this kind. This
process of making sense of the image can be productively
considered in relation to the constructivist theories of emotional
perception and experience (Russell, 2003), and in particular the
model of situated conceptualization (Barrett and Satpute, 2013;
Barrett, 2015; see also Minissale, 2013: p. 104–06).
FUTURE CHALLENGES
Given the phenomenological and psychological complexity
of the empathy-related responses that are an inherent part
of art experience and the manifold factors that co-determine
the specific course of the experience, two important questions
arise: (i) how is the proposed interaction of socio-cognitive and
esthetic processing instantiated by brain structures, and (ii) can
the model be experimentally verified? The imminent challenge,
then, is to develop experimental neuroimaging paradigms
for investigating the interaction of socio-affective/cognitive
and esthetic processing, under different variables of task
conditions/context modulations, image characteristics and
personal profiles of subjects.5 For instance, our preliminary
results from an ongoing pilot study suggest that by emulating
semantic priming in naturalistic conditions by providing
viewers with specific viewing instructions aimed at guiding their
attention either to the subjects and the emotions elicited by the
subjects in the observer, or to the representational and artistic
features of the work, it is possible to isolate distinct patterns of
neuronal activity related to either socio-affective/cognitive or
esthetic processing. Furthermore, as it is recognized that the
5We acknowledge, but do not further discuss here, the methodological difficulties
of isolating specific socio-affective/cognitive and esthetic processing. As noted
by Adolphs (2010, 761), the distinction between social and nonsocial is always
introduced by the experimenter.
temporal dynamics of the neuronal activity that underlies both
affective (empathic) and esthetic experience may be as important
as the spatial distribution of the activity (Immordino-Yang
et al., 2009; Adolphs, 2010; Cela-Conde and Ayala, 2015; Betti
and Aglioti, 2016; Kirsch et al., 2016), a major methodological
challenge is to find ways of combining and integrating the
data drawn from high spatial resolution (fMRI) with “fast”
electrocortical data. Another challenge, to recap what has already
been noted, concerns the possibility of experimentally verifying
the role of the subjectively perceived reality effect—that is, the
degree to which the subject’s sense that the depicted figures and
events are real (a sense generated both by the characteristics
of a representational medium (as such) and by task condition)
impacts the magnitude and specific profile of the empathic
response.
Finally, the view of empathic response that we embraced here
highlights the crucial importance of subjectively felt, conscious
experience. As Lamm and Majdandžic (2015) recently pointed
out, methods such as fMRI only provide information on neural
responses that co-occur with the experience of empathy. While
this point may seem self-evident, it is worth emphasizing that
any experimental research on empathic response to art that does
not attempt to correlate or integrate objective data with first-
person reports on subjective experience will provide a greatly
limited and constrained view of the phenomenon, such as could
be of little interest to scholars outside the neurosciences and
certainly would not foster much needed truly interdisciplinary
research efforts. We therefore conclude that the greatest general
challenge lies in developing experimental paradigms that would
permit correlating and integrating data on the neuronal indices
of empathic responses to images with behavioral indices and
with narrative first-person accounts of empathic response and
experience.
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